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CHAPTER 16 
State and Municipal Government: Home Rule 
§16.1. Introduction. Prior to 1966, the regulation of the affairs of 
the cities and towns of the Commonwealth was vested primarily in 
the General Court. In order for a municipality to react to the needs 
of its citizens, it would have to seek specific enabling legislation from 
the legislature.1 The increasing demands upon local government, 
together with the time-consuming method of reacting to these demands, 
led to the passage of Article 89 of the Amendments to the Constitu-
tion, which established the basic right of municipalities to self-govern-
ment.2 The Home Rule Procedures Act (HRPA),3 in turn, was passed 
to detail the procedures under which the municipalities could effect 
this constitutional grant of home rule. It will be the purpose of this 
chapter to: (I) set forth an exposition of the HRPA, (2) analyze its 
impact upon previous legislation in this field, and (3) criticize some 
of the major defects and ambiguities which appear in the act. 
§16.2. The steps to home rule. The HRPA became law, in the 
words of the preamble, "to facilitate the orderly implementation of 
Article LXXXIX of the Amendments to the Constitution." Article 
89, the constitutional source for home rule, establishes the right of 
municipalities to self-government, and specifies those areas of munici-
pal authority over which the legislature retains limited, contingent 
control. While Article 89 outlined, in general, the procedures to be 
followed in effectuating home rule, it soon became apparent that 
these general procedures would not be sufficient to govern the imple-
mentation of the amendment. In his message to the General Court 
concerning the HRPA, Governor Volpe stated: "In the absence of 
uniform standards promulgated by law setting forth in greater detail 
the procedures to be followed, there will be much confusion, litigation 
and delay in revising charters."l It was to allay such confusion that the 
HRPA became law. 
The HRPA provides for three methods of changing charters: (1) 
§16.1. 1 In the four years, 1950, 1956, 1959, and 1960, of 15,809 bills introduced 
into the General Court, nearly twenty percent (3202) were related to the affairs 
of cities and towns. In 1965, the General Court enacted over two hundred special 
acts relating to the governance of the cities and towns of the Commonwealth. 
Massachusetts Legislative Research Council, Report Relative to Municipal Home 
Rule, Senate No. 580, 78 (1961). 
2 Article 89 was adopted by the General Courts of the political years 1963 and 
1965, and was approved by the people on November 8, 1966. 
:I G.L., c. 43B. [Hereinafter cited as HRPA.] This act was passed by the General 
Court in the Extra Session of 1966. 
§16.2. 1 House No. 4083 (1966). 
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adoption of a new charter,2 (2) revision of a home rule charter,S and 
(3) amendment of any charter.4 The act outlines one set of procedures 
to be followed in the adoption and revision process, and a distinct 
set to be followed in the amendment process. 
Adoption or revision. The threshold step in the adoption or revision 
of a charter is the filing of a petition with the board of registrars of 
voters in the city or town. The petition, calling for an adoption or 
revision, must be signed by at least fifteen percent of the voters in the 
municipality eligible to vote in the preceding state election.5 Within 
ten days after the filing of the petition, the municipal legislative body 
(be it city councilor town board of selectmen) must receive the certi-
fied petition.6 
From the date of receipt of the petitions, the legislative body 
has thirty days within which it must provide, by order, for an election 
or town meeting at which the question of adopting or revising a 
charter, and the election of a charter commission is to be submitted 
to the voters.1 The ballot does not contain any proposals for substan-
tive cha.rter change, but merely relates to whether there is to be a 
charter revision or adoption.s This order must provide for the nomi-
nation of candidates to the charter commission.9 If the legislative 
body should fail to issue such an order, then the question of adopting 
or revising a charter will nonetheless be submitted to the voters, and 
charter commission members will be elected.10 Within ninety days 
after the receipt of the certified petitions by the legislative body, the 
date of the election will be set. The appearance on either the petition 
or the ballot of any political designation is forbidden.ll 
The ballot consists of two parts: the first directed to whether a 
charter commission shall be elected, the second to the actual election 
of the members of the commission.12 The election of the charter 
commission becomes effective only upon an affirmative vote on the 
question of the existence of the commission.13 
2HRPA §3. 
SId. 
4Id. §IO. Neither the HRP A nor Article 89 distinguishes between "revision" and 
"amendment." Thus, a municipality which has adopted a charter under the 
HRPA may effect further changes in the charter either through the revision or the 
amendment process. 
5Id. §3. 
6Id. 
1Id. §4. 
8 Section 3 of Article 89 contains the form of the question. If the city or town 
has not previously adopted a charter under Article 89, the question shall be: "Shall 
a commission be elected to frame a charter for (name of city or town)?" When 
dealing with a charter previously adopted under this article, the question shall be: 
"Shall a commission be elected to revise the charter of (name of city or town)?" 
9HRPA §4. 
10Id. The act does not explain how this automatic election is to take place. 
Apparently, the city or town's election officials will proceed with the election in 
spite of such failure to issue the appropriate order. 
11 Id. §§5, 6. 
12Id. §6. 
IBId. 
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Once elected, the charter commission has almost complete discre-
tion in its organization. It may adopt its own procedural rules and 
employ such staff as it may deem necessary.14 The responsibility for 
financing the activities of the commission rests primarily with the 
city or town. The HRPA requires that the municipality credit to the 
commission's account certain minimum sums of money, depending 
upon the size of the municipality.15 These required sums range from 
$500 in a municipality with fewer than 6000 inhabitants to $10,000 
in a city with a population exceeding 100,000.16 The municipality has 
the option of appropriating up to ten times this minimum amount.17 
The commission, however, may accept funds from private sources.18 
The commission must hold at least one public hearing within forty-
five days after its election.19 Within eight months of its election the 
commission must publish a preliminary report which includes the 
text and explanation of any proposed changes.2o A copy of this report 
is forwarded to the Attorney General so that he may inform the com-
mission of any conflicts with state law.21 After further public hearings, 
the commission must submit its final report to the municipal legisla-
tive body. The time period between the commission's election and the 
submission of this final report may not exceed ten months.22 
Upon the submission of the commission's report recommending 
charter changes to the legislative body, an election will be ordered at 
the first regular city election, or at the first regular town meeting held 
more than two months after the order issues.23 The HRPA requires 
that a summary of the basic changes be provided on the ballot.24 
The amendment process. Amendments to a city or town charter 
previously adopted under the HRPA may be proposed by a two-thirds 
vote of the city councilor town meeting.25 Such amendments may be 
proposed only with the concurrence of the mayor in a city which 
has a mayor.26 Only the charter commission may propose changes 
14 Id. §8(a). 
15Id. §8(b). 
16Id. 
17Id. 
18Id. §8(a). Such acceptance is subject to two conditions: (I) the source must be 
recorded in the clerk's office; (2) any conditions incident to the commission's 
acceptance of the funds are not binding on the city or town. 
19 Id. §9(a). 
20Id. §9(b). 
21Id. Curiously, the HRPA does not set forth any procedure if the proposed 
charter revision is found by the Attorney-General to be in conflict with state law. 
An amendment submitted to him, however, will not take effect until he renders 
an opinion that it does not so conflict. Id. §IO(c). 
22Id. §9(c). 
23Id. §Il. 
24Id. 
25Id. §IO (a). For a discussion as to whether the amendment procedures of Sec-
tion 10 are applicable to optional charters adopted under Chapter 43 of the 
General Laws, see §16.4 infra. 
26 Id. For a discussion of whether this section creates an absolute veto power in 
the mayor over proposals of amendments to the electorate, see §16.5 infra. 
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in the composition, mode of election or appointment of the munici-
pality's legislative and executive departments.27 
The municipal legislative body must also consider and vote upon 
any charter amendment which it would have the power to propose 
and which is suggested to it in writing by the mayor, city manager, or 
a councilman, or submitted to it by a petition signed by at least that 
number of registered voters necessary to nominate a member of the 
charter commission.28 Within three months after any suggested amend-
ment is filed, a public hearing must be held to consider this amend-
ment and any others suggested. Final action upon the amendment 
must be taken not later than six months after filing in a city or not 
later than the first annual meeting in a town.29 
The order providing for the election on the amendment will not 
become effective until the Attorney General reports that the amend-
ment does not conflict with the Constitution or laws of the Common-
wealth.30 The order is not subject to referendum nor does it require 
the concurrence of the mayor.31 
Judicial review. The HRPA provides for a method whereby its 
procedures may be enforced by the courts of the Commonwealth. 
Upon petition of either the Attorney-General or ten registered voters 
in a municipality, the Superior Court has jurisdiction, in equity, to 
enforce the provisions of the HRPA.32 The HRPA imposes a thirty-
day statute of limitations, starting from the date of the election on 
the proposed changes, on actions contesting the validity of the pro-
cedures whereby any charter is adopted, revised or amended.33 
§16.3. Home rule. Before 1966, the source of the authority of the 
state over municipalities was found in the predecessor to Article 89-
Article II of the Amendments to the Constitution.1 Under Article II, 
27Id. 
28Id. §lO(b). A town meeting similarly has the obligation to consider and vote 
upon amendments suggested by the town manager or any selectman, or by a 
petition signed by at least ten registered voters. 
29Id. §lO(b). 
30Id. §IO(c). 
31Id. §IO(d). Section 10 requires the mayor's concurrence before the city council 
may propose an amendment to the electorate. Once the mayor concurs in such 
proposal, however, he has no further veto power over the council orders which 
call for the election. 
32Id. §14(1). 
33Id. §14(3). 
§16.3. 1 Originally Article II of the Amendments stated, in pertinent part: 
"The general court shall have full power and authority to erect and constitute 
municipal or city governments, in any corporate town or towns in this common-
wealth, and to grant to the inhabitants thereof such powers, privileges, and 
immunities, not repugnant to the constitution as the general court shall deem 
necessary or expedient for the regulation and government thereof and to prescribe 
the manner of calling and holding public meetings of the inhabitants, in wards 
or otherwise for the election of officers under the constitution, and the manner of 
returning the votes given at such meetings .... [A]ll by-laws made by such 
municipal or city government shall be subject, at all times, to be annulled by the 
general court." Mass. Const. amend. art. II (1821). 
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"the towns of the Commonwealth possess[ed] no inherent right to 
self-government .... "2 The municipality was entirely a creature of 
the state in that all of its actions were subject to the veto power of 
the legislature.s The General Court had complete plenary power to 
control the scope and objects of the activities of municipal corpora-
tions.4 
In keeping with the view that municipalities possessed no inherent 
powers, prior to 1915 the General Court would place a given charter 
into effect by special act. Although such charters were designed to 
provide for the particular needs of a given municipality,5 they were 
products of the legislature and could be modified only by subsequent 
special or general law.6 Those municipalities which did not possess 
special act charters operated under the General Laws and under 
special acts passed by the General Court to enable them to exercise a 
given power. 
In 1915, with the passage of Chapter 43 of the General Laws, the 
legislature attempted to grant to the municipalities of the Common-
wealth a measure of autonomy. Under this chapter, the General Court 
offered several different plans of government and gave to the voters 
of a municipality the option of choosing among them.7 It is significant 
that Chapter 43 did not change the traditional view toward the 
autonomy of the municipality. Although it gave to the cities and 
towns options as to form of government, it was the state legislature 
which created the charters from which the municipalities chose. Those 
municipalities which declined to elect one of the Chapter 43 plans 
were subject to the same control and had to utilize the same avenues 
for change that existed prior to 1915. 
The courts of the Commonwealth have reinforced the inferior legal 
position imposed upon municipalities by narrowly construing against 
the municipality those powers which are expressly granted to it by 
statute or charter. This judicial position was succinctly stated in 
Berube v. Selectmen of Edgartown:8 "[MJunicipalities can exercise 
only such powers as are expressly or impliedly conferred upon them 
by the legislature." Statutes relating to powers conferred upon munici-
palities "have always been given a strict construction."9 In narrowly 
2 Paddock v. Town of Brookline, 347 Mass. 230, 238, 197 N.E.2d 321, 326 (1964). 
3 See Mayor of Gloucester v. City Clerk of Gloucester, 327 Mass. 460, 464, 99 
N.E.2d 452, 455 (1951). 
4 See Opinion of the Justices, 323 Mass. 759, 761, 79 N.E.2d 889, 890 (1948). 
Ii Haffner v. Director of Public Safety of Lawrence, 329 Mass. 709, 714, 110 N.E.2d 
369, 372 (1953). 
6 See Mass. Const. amend. art. II (1821). 
7 The five plans which Chapter 43 offered were: Plan A (strong mayor and weak 
council), G.L., c. 43, §§46-55; Plan B (weak mayor and strong council), id. §§56-63; 
Plan C (commission), id. §§64-78; Plan D (city manager), id. §§79-92A; and Plan E 
(a modification of D), id. §§93-116. In 1959, the General Court added Plan F, 
which created the option of government by mayor and council elected at large 
and nominated in party primaries. Id. §§1l7-127. 
8331 Mass. 72, 74, 117 N.E.2d 134, 136 (1958). 
9 MacRae v. Selectmen of Concord, 296 Mass. 394, 397, 6 N.E.2d 366, 367 (1937); 
accord, Adie v. Mayor of Holyoke, 303 Mass. 295, 299, 21 N.E.2d 377, 380 (1939). 
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construing municipal power, the Massachusetts courts have tacitly 
accepted "Dillon's rule," which, in capsule, states: "Any fair, reason-
able, substantial doubt concerning the existence of a power is resolved 
by the courts against the [municipal] corporation, and the power is 
denied."10 In Massachusetts, then, the municipality has held only 
those powers which the legislature has expressly granted. And even 
these expressly granted powers have been narrowly construed against 
the municipality. 
In 1966, Article 2 of the Amendments to the Constitution was re-
placed by Article 89. The new article is the constitutional source for 
home rule in the Commonwealth. Section I of Article 89 grants "to 
the people of every city and town the right of self-government in local 
matters, subject to the provisions of this article and to such standards 
and requirements as the general court may establish .... " There are 
two limitations within this general grant of power set out in Section 
1. First, the right extends only to "local matters."ll Moreover, no 
exercise of this right may be inconsistent with the Constitution or 
with the General Laws as have been or may be enacted by the General 
Court.12 
Out of the broad right to self-government in local matters granted 
in Section 1, Section 8 sets apart certain areas of municipal govern-
ment in which the General Court may act through "general laws 
which apply alike to all cities or to all towns, ... or to a class of not 
fewer than two .... " Significantly, Section 8 also grants to the General 
Court the right to enact special acts: 
(1) on petition filed or approved by the voters of a city or town, 
or the mayor and city council, or other legislative body, of a city, 
or the town meeting of a town, with respect to a law relating to 
that city or town; (2) by a two-thirds vote of each branch of the 
general court following a recommendation by the governor .... 
Thus, under these two conditions, the General Court retains the 
power to act in relation to a city or town in limitation of the broad 
rights conferred by Section 1. 
Section 6 grants to municipalities the authority to exercise any 
"power or function which the general court has the power to confer 
upon it," provided that the power is not inconsistent with the Con-
stitution or General Laws, and that it is not denied to the municipality 
by its own charter. Instead of searching for statutes authorizing mu-
nicipal action, municipalities now "need only be concerned about 
constitutional or statutory provisions forbidding local action or estab-
lishing standards for particular actions."13 Section 6 applies to every 
city and town, whether or not it has adopted a home rule charter. 
101 Dillon, Municipal Corporations §237 (5th ed. 1911). 
11 Mass. Const. amend. art. LXXXIX, §l. 
12Id. §6. 
13 Massachusetts Legislative Research Council, Report Relative to Municipal 
Home Rule (Proposed Constitutional Amendment), Senate No. 950, 123 (1965). 
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Section 7 excludes certain specific powers from municipal home 
rule authority.14 Any municipal exercise of these prohibited powers 
must be specifically authorized by the General Court. This section, 
thus, narrows the breadth of the power granted to cities and towns in 
Section 6. 
In spite of the limitations of Section 8, Section 6 manifests a new 
legislative attitude toward municipal power. If the broad grant of 
power is allowed to exist without judicial narrowing,ll> then Article 
89 has reversed the strict-constructionist approach of Dillon's rule and 
has granted to the cities and town of the Commonwealth all those 
powers not specifically denied them by the General Court.16 The 
American Municipal Association reached this conclusion17 concerning 
its own model home rule statute, which contains a section similar to 
Section 6.18 The AMA concluded that its approach 
emphatically reverses the old strict-constructionist presumption 
against the existence of municipal powers and, so long as the 
legislature does not expressly deny a particular power, renders 
unnecessary petitioning the legislature for enabling legislation.19 
Given the similarity between the AMA model and Section 6, it would 
appear that the General Court intended to use Section 6 to reverse 
the strict-constructionist approach. 
§16.4. Impact of the HRPA: Section 10. The impact of the 
HRPA depends, to a considerable extent, upon whether the amend-
ment procedures detailed in Section 10 of the act apply to charters 
enacted under Chapter 43 of the General Laws. Section 10 limits the 
application of its procedures to two classes of charters: (1) charters 
adopted or revised under the HRP A, (2) "laws having the force of a 
city or town charter by virtue of Section 9 of Article LXXXIX." In 
order for the amendment procedures set forth in Section 10 to apply 
to Chapter 43 charters, it is necessary to find that Chapter 43 charters 
fall within one of the above two classifications. Clearly, Chapter 43 
charters do not fall within the first category. Thus, the question be-
comes whether Chapter 43 charters are "laws" within the meaning 
14 These excluded powers are the power to lay taxes, to borrow money, to enact 
private or civil law governing civil relationships, to punish felonies, to regulate 
elections, or to dispose of park land. 
15 Such narrowing occurred in New York and Rhode Island. See §16.6 infra. 
16 Massachusetts Legislative Research Council, note 13 supra. 
17Fordham, Home Rule-AMA Model, 44 Nat!. Munic. Rev. 137, 140 (1955), 
quoting the official comments to the AMA draft. 
18 See id. at 140. The pertinent language of this section reads: "A municipal 
corporation which adopts a home rule charter may exercise any power or perform 
any function whim the legislature has the power to devolve upon a non-home rule 
charter municipal corporation and which is not denied to that municipal corpora-
tion by its home rule marter, is not denied to all home rule charter municipal 
corporations by statute and is within such limitations as may be established by 
statute." 
19 Id., quoting the official comments to the AMA draft. 
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of. the second classification and, thereby, fall within the ambit of 
Section 10. 
Section 9 of Article 89 reads: 
All special laws relating to individual cities and towns shall re-
main in effect and have the force of an existing city or town 
charter, but shall be subject to amendment or repeal through the 
adoption, revision or amendment of a charter by a city or town 
in accordance with the provisions of sections three and four and 
shall be subject to amendment or repeal by laws enacted by the 
general court in conformity with the power reserved to the 
general court by section eight. 
This section recognizes that the majority of Massachusetts cities and 
towns operate not under a formal charter granted by the General 
Court, but rather under the General Laws and under specific special 
acts passed by the legislature authorizing activity not enumerated in 
the General Laws. This section has the dual effect of (I) defining a 
charter as including "all special laws relating to cities and towns," 
and (2) authorizing the city or town to modify these special laws 
having the force of a city or town charter under the adoption, re-
vision or amendment process of the HRPA. In order for Chapter 43 
charters to fall within the literal scope of Section 10, they must be 
found to be "special laws" within the meaning of Section 9 of Article 
89. 
There is a distinct lack of decisional authority on this point. There 
has been only one Massachusetts case which has held a Chapter 43 
charter to be a special law. In Welch v. Contributory Retirement 
Appeal Board,l the Supreme Judicial Court, specifically referring to a 
charter adopted under Chapter 43, stated that "city charters are es-
sentially special enactments designed to provide for the particular 
needs of the various cities."2 While this holding would indicate that 
such charters would fall within the definition of "charter" as stated in 
Section 9, it is submitted that this case is of dubious validity. In char-
acterizing charters adopted under Chapter 43 as "special enactments," 
the Court in Welch relied specifically upon the earlier case of Haffner 
v. Director of Public Safety.3 In Haffner, the Supreme Judicial Court 
characterized the charter of the city of Lawrence as a special enact-
ment.4 This charter, however, became law by special act in 19115 -
four years before the enactment of Chapter 43. The holding in Haff-
ner, therefore, that charters were special laws could not have been 
intended to be applicable to Chapter 43 charters.6 It is anomalous, 
§16.4. 1343 Mass. 502, ISO N.E.2d 326 (1962). 
2Id. at 507, ISO N.E.2d at 330, quoting Haffner v. Director of Public Safety of 
Lawrence, 329 Mass. 709, 714, 110 N.E.2d 369, 372 (1953). 
3329 Mass. 709, 110 N.E.2d 369 (1953). 
41d. at 714, 110 N.E.2d at 372. 
5 Acts of 1911, c. 621. 
6 This holding could be considered inapplicable to the situation in WeIch for 
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therefore, that the Court in Welch should have used Haffner as au-
thority for its holding that Chapter 43 charters are special enactments. 
The classification of Chapter 43 charters as special laws further 
conflicts with decisional precedents in other states with similar statutes. 
New Jersey has a statutory provision, similar to Chapter 43, which 
authorizes municipalities to choose from several optional forms of 
government.7 When specifically confronted with the objection that 
this statute was a special law and was, therefore, prohibited by the 
New Jersey constitution, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held this 
statute to be a general law: 
The optional plans ... are available to all municipalities in gen-
eral. The fact that the voters of all municipalities do not adopt 
the same plan does not mean that a special . . . law has been 
enacted in each case. The Legislature has enacted a generallaw.8 
In 1922, Georgia provided by general act for the establishment of a 
county-manager form of government which would go into effect only 
in those counties where a majority of voters favored it.9 The Georgia 
Supreme Court, again directly confronted with the contention that 
this was a special law, stated: 
The fact that this act provides that it shall not go into effect in 
any county ... except upon a majority vote of the qualified voters 
of the county does not rob it of its character as a general statute 
and make it a special one.10 
Furthermore, Chapter 43 charters would appear not to fall within 
the generally accepted definition of special law. McQuillan, in his 
work on municipal corporations, suggests the following definition of 
special law: 
[A] law is special, as distinguished from general, if it embraces 
less than the entire class of persons, places, or things to whose 
condition such legislation would be necessary or appropriate, 
having regard to the purpose for which the law is designed.11 
The Supreme Judicial Court has defined a special act as one which 
relates to particular wants, conditions and circumstances of the mu-
nicipality to which it is directed,12 Chapter 43 charters are clearly 
without either of these definitions. They apply to the entire class of 
cities of the Commonwealth and are not directed to anyone munici-
pality's needs. Thus the questionable validity of the Welch case, 
two reasons: (1) the Lawrence charter was passed before the enactment of Chapter 
43; and (2) the Lawrence charter was specifically passed as a special act. 
7 N.J. Stat. Ann., tit. 40, ch. 69A (Cum. Supp. 1965). 
8 Bucino v. Malone, 12 N.J. 330, 342, 96 A.2d 669, 675 (1953). 
9 Ga. Code Ann. §23-924 (1935). 
10 Marbut v. Hollingshead, 172 Ga. 531, 534, 158 S.E. 28, 30 (1931). 
112 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations §4.47 (3d ed. rev. 1966). 
12 See McKenna v. White, 287 Mass. 495, 499, 192 N.E. 84, 86 (1934). 
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coupled with the decisional precedents in other jurisdictions and the 
generally accepted definition of special law, indicates that Chapter 
43 charters are not special laws within the definition of Section 9 of 
Article 89 and, thus, are without the ambit of Section 10. 
Unless the General Court passed Section 10(e) with the Welch 
definition of Chapter 43 charters as special laws specifically in mind, 
the intent of the section appears clear: Chapter 43 charters may not 
be amended under the HRPA. Section 18, on the other hand, spe-
cifically affirms that "any city or town having a charter under chapter 
forty-three ... may change the same in accordance with the procedures 
for the adoption or amendment of a charter prescribed by this chap-
ter." Section 18, further, explicitly makes the HRPA procedures the ex-
clusive means by which "a city or town shall adopt or change charters 
or change its method of electing officers under ... [chapter] forty-
three ... or under any special laws in effect on such date .... " In 
Section 18, the word "change" is used in conjunction with the phrase 
"in accordance with the procedures for the adoption or amendment of 
a charter prescribed by this chapter." A reasonable reading of these 
two sentences should find that the amendment process falls within 
the meaning of "change." Thus, Section 18 clearly seems to make the 
Section 10 amendment procedures applicable to Chapter 43 charters. 
Sections 2 and 4 of Article 89 are just as explicit. Section 2 states: "Any 
city or town shall have the power to adopt or revise a charter or to 
amend its existing charter through the provisions set forth in sec-
tions three and four." Section 4 states: "Every city and town shall 
have the power to amend its charter. . . ." These statements would 
appear to encompass all existing charters without limitations and, 
thus, would appear to include Chapter 43 charters. In spite of the 
failure of the General Court to include Chapter 43 charters within the 
classifications of Section 10, it is submitted that the precise inclusion of 
such charters in Section 18, coupled with the statements of Sections 2 
and 4 of Article 89, indicate that the amendment procedures of the 
HRPA were intended to extend to Chapter 43 charters. If Section 18 
is not granted such a literal meaning, it will effectively have no mean-
ing; and the weight of authority indicates that statutes should be 
construed to give them meaning.13 
§16.5. Impact of the HRPA: Veto power of the mayor. Section 
10(a) of the HRPA requires the concurrence of the mayor plus a 
two-thirds vote of the council before an amendment to a charter may 
be proposed to the electorate.1 This section contains no provision for 
overriding the mayor's lack of concurrence. Thus, it would appear that 
Section 10 grants to the mayor an absolute veto power over the pro-
posal of amendments to any charter. This would seem to conflict with 
the fact that certain of the Chapter 43 charters provide that the 
13 See e.g., Town of Milton v. Metropolitan District Comm'n, 342 Mass. 222, 225, 
172 N.E.2d 696, 699 (1961). 
§16.5. 1 This section emanates from Section 4 of Article 89. 
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municipal legislative body may overcome the mayor's veto by a two-
thirds vote.2 The question then becomes whether the provisions for 
overriding the mayor's veto in these Chapter 43 charters apply to 
the proposal of amendments under the HRPA. Section 18 specifies 
that the amendment procedures set out in the HRP A are to be the 
exclusive means of amending any charter, be it a conglomerate of gen-
eral and special laws or a specific charter taken from Chapter 43. This 
clear statement of legislative intent should control the veto provisions 
of any Chapter 43 charter. 
The impact of this absolute veto power goes beyond merely lessen-
ing the effectiveness of the amendment procedures of the HRP A. If, 
for some reason, the legislative and executive branches of a munici-
pality are unable to agree on a proposed charter amendment, then 
the sole avenue open to effectuate the amendment is the creation of 
a charter commission for revision of the charter. Once the charter 
commission is elected, however, there is nothing in the statute which 
would limit its activity to the change embodied in the deadlocked 
amendment. The commission would be free to undertake a whole-
sale revision of the municipal charter - a result which neither the 
executive nor legislative body may have envisioned. Thus, a conflict 
between the mayor and council of a municipality over a proposed 
charter amendment could be resolved only by recourse to a costly 
and politically unpredictable charter commission. 
The source of the mayor's absolute veto power is Section 4 of 
Article 89. In granting this veto power, the HRPA is simply restating 
a provision which its constitutional source made mandatory. Any 
solution to the problems resulting from this absolute veto power 
must, then, come through constitutional change of Article 89 rather 
than legislative revision of the HRP A. The General Court could 
not, through the HRPA, negate Article 89's clear expression of inten-
tion. It is submitted, therefore, that Article 89 should have provided 
for some means by which such conflicts could be resolved without re-
course to a politically unpredictable charter commission. 
A further complication arises in the application of this Section 10 
veto power to a Plan C (Commission) Chapter 43 charter. Section 10 
appears to grant the Plan C mayor a veto power over amendments 
while the Plan C charter specifically denies the mayor the veto 
power.3 Section 10 defines "mayor" thus: "In this section the word 
mayor shall mean an officer elected by the voters of a city as the chief 
executive officer of a city or an officer lawfully acting as such .... " 
Under the Plan C charter the commissioner of administration is desig-
nated as mayor and "shall be the chief executive officer of the city."4 
Thus the Plan C mayor appears to fall within the definition of the 
term mayor as used in Section lO(a). 
This apparent conflict could be resolved by a judicial interpretation 
2 G.L., c.43, §55 (Plan A); id. §63 (Plan B); id. §125 (Plan F). 
3Id. §74. 
4Id. 
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of the term "mayor" to be one who is elected as such, and not one 
who becomes mayor by virtue of his election as commissioner of ad. 
ministration. The power of the commissioner of administration falls 
far short of the mayor's power in any of the three other forms of 
government which provide for a mayor with veto power.5 It would 
appear, therefore, that Section 10 would not vest in the Plan C mayor 
any new power and would not require his concurrence for the pro-
posal of amendments to the electorate. 
§16.6. Limitations on the home rule power. There are several 
limitations which the HRPA and Article 89 impose upon the broad 
grant of home rule power: (1) the local city or town's power of self-
government relates only to "local matters";1 (2) the municipality's 
actions must be consistent with the Constitution and General Laws, 
and the city or town charter;2 and (3) the General Court retains the 
right to act in relation to the cities and towns by general law and, 
in certain situations, by speciallaw.3 
Under Article 89, the right to self-government relates only to "local 
matters ... subject to such standards and requirements as the gen-
eral court may establish by law in accordance with the provisions of 
this article." Nowhere, however, in either the statutory or case law, 
is there an adequate definition of the term "local matters." What 
emerges from a reading of the cases is the traditional narrow view 
of municipal power under which cities and towns are held to be 
"political subdivisions created for the convenient administration of 
government. ... "4 It is submitted that the failure of the General 
Court to define "local matters," taken in light of this historical, nar-
row view of municipal power, may have been an invitation to judicial 
emasculation of home rule. 
Such has been the result both in New York and in Rhode Island. 
The New York constitution conferred upon the municipalities the 
power to act in matters relating to their "property, affairs or govern-
ment."5 The New York courts, adhering to the maxim that grants of 
local power are narrowly construed against the municipality, essen-
tially defeated the purpose of home rule by developing a narrow 
definition of "property, affairs or government."6 The Rhode Island 
constitution similarly granted to the cities and towns of that state 
"the power . . . to . . . enact and amend local laws relating to its 
property, affairs and government. . . ."7 Again, the Rhode Island 
5 See id. §75. 
§16.6. 1 Mass. Const. amend. art. LXXXIX, §l. 
2Id. §6. 
3Id. §8. 
4 Burnham v. Mayor and Aldermen of Beverly, 309 Mass. 388, 389, 35 N.E.2d 
242, 243 (1941). 
5 N.Y. Const. art. IX, §12. 
6 See Salzman v. Impellitteri, 305 N.Y. 414, 421-422, 113 N.E.2d 543, 544 (1953) 
(dissenting opinion); Comment, Home Rule and the New York Constitution, 66 
Colum. L. Rev. 1145, 1148-1149 (1966). 
7 R.I. Const. amend. 28, §2. 
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Supreme Court frustrated the purpose of this home rule amendment 
by narrowly defining "property, affairs and government."8 In both 
of these cases the legislatures failed to define the scope of municipal 
authority. The state courts, when faced with the necessity of develop-
ing such a definition, ignored what appeared to be the intent of the 
constitutional provisions, and vitiated the municipal home rule power 
with a narrow definition of "property, affairs or government." 
As stated earlier, the purpose of Section 6 of Article 89 is to re-
verse the traditional view that a municipal corporation may exercise 
only those powers specifically granted by the Legislature. Subject to 
the exclusions of Section 7 of Article 89,9 Section 6 effectively allows 
the municipality, by by-law or ordinance, to exercise any power which 
the General Court could have granted to it. Section 6, however, con-
tains two limitations upon the exercise of this power. The by-law or 
ordinance may not be "inconsistent with the Constitution or laws 
enacted by the general court in conformity with the powers reserved 
to the general court by section eight of Article LXXXIX . . . and 
[may not be] denied, either expressly or by clear implication, to the 
city or town by its charter." 
These limitations are not novel ones in Massachusetts; nor are they 
necessarily in derogation of home rule powers. The Massachusetts 
rule traditionally has been that any local ordinance must comply both 
with the General LawslO and with the city or town charter.ll Such a 
rule is a logical necessity to prevent the municipality from passing an 
ordinance which authorizes activity which the General Court has 
forbidden, or forbidding activity which the General Court has au-
thorized. 
To this point the limitations on the home rule powers of munici-
palities have been negative, consisting of specific exclusions and nar-
row constructional rules. Section 8 of Article 89, however, places in 
the General Court the affirmative authority to regulate municipal 
powers and functions "by general laws which apply alike to all cities, 
or to all towns, or to all cities and towns, or to a class of not fewer 
than two .... " Thus, the state retains the authority to preempt by 
General Law any municipal power or function. Section 8 also allows 
the General Court to regulate municipal affairs by passage of special 
laws, applicable to a specific municipality, either on petition of the 
executive and legislative branches of the municipality or on the recom-
mendation of the Governor and a two-thirds vote of the General Court. 
The inclusion of this municipal right to petition the General Court 
for a special act presents a means by which a municipality may peti-
tion the legislature for authority to exercise some power or function 
which a general law precludes. This could make the city or town 
8 Newport Amusement Co. v. Maher, 92 R.I. 51, 166 A.2d 216 (1960). 
9 See §16.3, note 14 supra. 
10 Schertzer v. City of Somerville, 345 Mass. 747, 750, 189 N.E.2d 555, 557-558 
(1963). 
11 Dos Santos v. City of Peabody, 327 Mass. 519, 522, 99 N.E.2d 852, 853 (1951). 
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more responsive to local needs and desires and would not necessarily 
be inconsistent with the earlier requirements that the General Court 
pass only general laws in relation to the cities and towns. 
The inclusion of the right in the General Court to pass special acts 
without the consent of the municipality, by a two-thirds vote on recom-
mendation of the Governor, is more difficult to reconcile with the 
concept of home rule. Under this provision, the possibility exists that 
the General Court could interfere in municipal affairs to the same 
extent as before the passage of Article 89 and the HRPA. This in-
clusion of the authority to pass special acts without local consent is 
in derogation of home rule power and leaves open an avenue of legis-
lative infringement upon home rule. 
Ironically, however, the inclusion of this right in the General Court 
may be the single factor which could save Massachusetts home rule 
from a narrow judicial definition of "local matters." Although this 
provision raises the possibility of a legislative interference in munici-
pal affairs which would be in derogation of the home rule power, its 
aim appears to be to vest in the General Court ultimate veto power 
over any municipal act. In this regard, the Massachusetts home rule 
structure differs from that of both New York and Rhode Island. In 
New York, the legislature may pass such special laws only when re-
quested to do so by the mayor of the municipality and a majority of 
the municipal legislative body, or by a two-thirds vote of the local 
legislative body.12 In Rhode Island, the legislature retains the power 
to pass special laws relating to a municipality only upon the approval 
of a majority of the municipality'S electorate.13 Thus, there would 
exist an area of municipal sovereignty, the breadth of which would 
be determined by a judicial definition of "property, affairs and gov-
ernment," in which the legislature could act neither by general nor 
special law. It is understandable, then, that the New York and Rhode 
Island courts would narrowly define an area of municipal authority 
over which the state would have no effective check. In Massachusetts, 
however, the inclusion of the right in the General Court to pass spe-
cial acts without the consent of the municipality creates just such a 
check upon municipal power. Upon recommendation of the Gov-
ernor and a two-thirds vote of the General Court, the state may 
exercise ultimate veto power over any municipal act, thereby pro-
tecting its own interests. It is submitted, therefore, that the existence 
of such a veto power in the General Court would eliminate the pri-
mary reservation which a court would have in broadly defining "local 
matters" - protection of the sovereign's interest. 
§16.7. Conclusions. The general purpose of the HRPA is to detail 
simple procedures whereby the constitutional grant of home rule 
power, found in Article 89 of the Amendments to the Constitution, 
may be effectuated by any municipality of the Commonwealth. Since 
12 N.Y. Const. art. IX, §ll. 
13 R.I. Const. amend. 28, §4. 
14
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1967 [1967], Art. 19
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1967/iss1/19
278 1967 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §16.7 
the HRPA was passed specifically to implement Article 89, most of 
the difficulties which arise with the act find their source in Article 89. 
Article 89 outlines the rigid procedures which must be followed 
to utilize the home rule power. The elements of this rigid structure 
are: (1) the initiative for adoption or revision of a municipal charter 
under home rule must come from the electorate;1 (2) the charter 
commission has ten months within which it must complete its task;2 
and (3) the home rule procedures are strictly nonpartisan.3 
Article 89 provides that the initiative for a charter adoption or re-
vision must come from the electorate. There is no provision whereby 
the legislative body of a municipality may initiate the process. There 
appears to be no valid reason why such authority should be withheld 
from the legislative branch of the municipality. Voter apathy, reluc-
tance to sign any petition, and unfamiliarity with the technical 
changes which may be required in a city or town charter could make 
obtaining the necessary fifteen percent of registered voters difficult 
and could, therefore, lessen the practical value of the HRPA. Further, 
there are difficulties which may arise when a conflict between a mayor 
and council requires the election of a charter commission to accom-
plish limited charter change. Several states have adopted the more 
flexible alternative of having the charter revision process initiate from 
either the electorate or the legislative body.4 
Article 89 further establishes a ten-month limit within which the 
charter commission must develop the changes which will be sub-
mitted to the electorate. The adequacy of this period is questionable 
in light of the fact that the commission members receive no compen-
sation, and that in this interval the commission must hold at least 
one public hearing on the proposed changes. The intent of the Gen-
eral Court in setting up these time limits seems to have been to pre-
vent the home rule process from becoming interminable. Once begun, 
the adoption or revision process must attain some conclusion. It is 
submitted that a too hasty conclusion could be just as damaging as 
one which is delayed. 
Perhaps the most severe objection which can be levied at Article 
89 is that it makes a nonpartisan charter commission mandatory. It 
is conceded that a nonpartisan charter commission would be ideal. 
The thought of responsible citizens engaged in deliberations which 
are untainted by politics is an alluring one. But the charter commis-
sion will discuss questions which are inherently political- ward dis-
tribution, mode of election of officials, etc. It would appear that the 
deliberations of the commission might be more meaningful if there 
were the adversary system which a division along political lines would 
probably insure. The electorate should be confronted with the altern a-
§16.7. 1 Mass. Const. amend. art. LXXXIX, §3. 
2Id. 
3Id. 
4 See e.g., N.Y. Munic. Home Rule Law §36 (2), (3); Cal. Const. art. 11, §8(a); 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §49-A:8 (Supp. 1965). 
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tives which a political confrontation would engender. Further, this 
nonpartisan organization would complicate the revision process in a 
city which had a Plan F form of government. This plan provides 
for a partisan government with a primary system. Such a city, under 
Article 89, would be forced to utilize a nonpartisan method to achieve 
charter revision. This would create an anomaly since the purpose of 
Article 89 is "to grant . . . to the people of every city and town 
the right of self-government in local matters .... "5 
There remain, however, specific difficulties which arise in the HRPA 
and which cannot be attributed to Article 89. The principal difficulty 
is the apparent conflict which exists between Sections 10 and 18 of 
the act. Section 10 appears to exclude Chapter 43 charters from the 
amendment process of the HRPA, while Section 18 explicitly in-
cludes them. Although the suggested resolution of this conflict would 
be in favor of the Section 18 inclusion of Chapter 43 charters, it is 
conceivable that a court could hold that, since Section 10 is the sole 
section of the HRPA which deals specifically with charter amend-
ments, its provisions must control. This would then place Chapter 
43 charters without the ambit of Section 10. The municipality would 
be able to amend its Chapter 43 charter under the HRPA only if it 
first "adopted" it in conformity with the adoption and revision pro-
cedures of the Act. It is submitted that this confusion and possible 
conflict could have been avoided if Section 10 had included a sub-
section lO(f) which specifically included Chapter 43 charters within 
the scope of Section 10. 
Section 14(3) of the HRP A establishes a thirty-day statute of limi-
tations on judicial challenges of the procedures by which any charter 
adoption, revision or amendment is approved. This section is open to 
two possible interpretations. The first is that, since Section 14(3) 
makes no provision for a challenge of procedures where the charter 
change has been rejected, the HRP A precludes a procedural chal-
lenge of a rejected charter change. This reading, however, would ap-
pear to conflict with Section 14(1). This section grants to the Superior 
Court equity jurisdiction "to enforce the provisions" of the HRP A. It 
would appear reasonable to read this section to allow such enforce-
ment whether a given charter change is ultimately adopted or de-
feated. 
A more reasonable reading of Section 14(3), however, is that it 
creates a short statute of limitations and makes it applicable only to 
challenges of approved charter changes. This would protect the mu-
nicipality, which has acted to effectuate a change in its charter, from 
having its government overturned by a subsequent finding that the 
change was improperly enacted. Under such a reading, however, a 
challenge of procedures by which a charter change has been rejected 
could be made at any time subsequent to the election. Although the 
time lapse between the rejection and the challenge would be subject 
5 Mass. Const. amend. art. LXXXIX, §l. 
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to the discretion of a court of equity, there appears to be no valid 
reason why this short statute should not also apply to instances where 
the charter change is rejected. In this way, all procedural challenges, 
with their ensuing litigation, would be cut off thirty days after the 
election, whether the change is approved or rejected. 
In spite of these criticisms, the HRPA does present to the munici-
palities of this Commonwealth the procedures by which they may 
modify their forms of government. Under the suggested resolution of 
the conflict between Sections 10 and 18, this power of modification 
exists as to any charter, whether its source is the General Laws or 
special acts. In detailing these procedures the HRP A has given effect 
to Article 89's shift of municipal authority from Beacon Hill to City 
Hall. Under the HRPA, the procedures now exist through which lo-
cal government may become effective, responsive, government. 
JOHN W. LEMEGA 
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